EU conditionality vis-a-vis Belarus: has it worked? by -
 
 
MONITORING 
MO #04/2009EN, 26 May 2009 
 
 
 
 
EU CONDITIONALITY VIS-À-VIS BELARUS: 
HAS IT WORKED? 
 
 
 
Following the initial 12 demands proposed by the EU in November 
2006 as a pre-condition to progress in EU-Belarus relations, 
coupled with the 5 further demands subsequently determined in 
October 2008, the emerging conclusion appears to be that whilst 
there has been some progress on several of the demands, the 
approach has been inconsistent and variable; often backtracking 
and giving mixed messages to the EU and the Belarusian people.  
 
Executive Summary 
After more than a decade of trying different strategies to encourage political 
progress in Belarus, the European Commission published, in November 2006, a 
non-paper What the EU Could Bring to Belarus, which laid out pre-requisites for 
closer relations with Belarus and established 12 conditions on which it wished 
to see progress. Five further demands were added in October 2008 to ensure 
that the Belarusian government would improve its poor human rights record 
and guarantee a greater role for civil society. Since 2008, the Belarusian 
authorities, facing the implications of the Georgia-Russia war and of the global 
economic downturn, began to show signs of acceptance of some elements of 
these conditions while in reality keeping progress to a minimum or at a 
standstill on others.  
Overall, the EU record on conditionality was poor both in terms that the policy 
achieved little and that conditions pronounced on behalf of the entire alliance 
were never fully supported by its members. Conditionality did help to structure 
the dialogue with the Belarusian authorities when they were ready to talk, and 
helped secure the release of political prisoners and establish a better working 
environment for the press. Otherwise, the failure to bring about more concrete 
steps and the developments which ensued, such as the removal of sanctions for 
top Belarusian officials, further testify to the EU largely abandoning its 
conditionality principle with regard to Belarus.  
To be successful, conditionality has to be supported by the broadest possible 
coalition of states, pursue a limited range of objectives, be specific and offer a 
clear and credible exit strategy for the other side. It has to offer substantial 
rewards for compliance for the groups making political decisions, as witnessed 
by the conditions imposed by the IMF in approving a loan to Belarus in January 
2009, alongside sanctions that may be introduced for a poor record. Sanctions 
can produce only a limited result and will work only in combination with other 
factors. 
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Introduction 
 
The European Union has used conditionality as a tool to promote human rights and 
democracy in third states, based on the positive experience of its application during the 
2004-07 EU enlargement process. Respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law topped the 1993 Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, thereby compelling Central 
European countries (CEE) to pursue political reforms and consolidate democratic 
achievements. The EU conditionality worked best when it offered a great prize in the end, 
namely membership in the European Union, which implied a full package of immediate 
and significant benefits for CEE and prescribed an equally wholesale kit of domestic 
reforms that had to be undertaken to consummate this prize. In fact, where membership 
was promised, the EU engaged in the most effective exercise of democracy promotion in 
the region. Where the membership offer was not feasible, as turned out to be the case 
with the largely ineffective European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) for example, the EU 
conditionality, by and large failed.  
 
Even more so the failure was evident in the case of Belarus, where political demands 
were presented in an inconsistent manner with no real incentive for the Belarusian 
government to comply. The European Union suspended the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement with Belarus in 1996 following the deteriorating human rights record in the 
country, and reduced contact with the Belarusian government to a minimum after the 
controversial constitutional referendum held in the same year. From the middle 90s 
through the early 2000s, the EU pursued the so-called step-by-step approach offering 
engagement in exchange for political democratisation, an approach that dictated to the 
Belarusian authorities what they need to do in order to keep up the minimum contact 
with the European Union. An alternative political and economic sponsorship offered to the 
Belarusian government by Russia helped Belarus to minimise the consequences of the 
isolation from the West, while occasional overtones to the EU constituted little more than 
attempts to tease the Kremlin once it was beginning to consider the reduction of 
subsidies, or was getting angry at the Belarusian leadership.  
 
The Georgia-Russia war of August 2008 and the encroaching global economic crisis made 
it crystal clear to the Belarusian government that in order to preserve both an economic 
and a political stability in the country, it has to open the door to the EU, and the only way 
to do so would be by demonstrating a willingness to respond positively to some of the EU 
demands. The cornerstone for the Belarusian authorities was how to do so to the 
satisfaction of the EU yet avoiding any risk of relinquishing their tight grip on power. The 
Belarusian government achieved this objective by exploiting the inconsistent and half-
hearted EU approach to its own demands, in which real-life policy decisions rarely 
factored. 
 
 
EU conditionality: changes in approach 
 
The European Commission’s November 2006 non-paper What the EU Could Bring to 
Belarus, which listed the 12 conditions that the Belarusian government should fulfil 
before it would be possible to restore normal relations with the EU and benefit from the 
ENP, has produced almost no results, as Belarus did not find there appealing incentives, 
which would have encouraged the Belarusian leadership to embark on painful reforms. 
Furthermore, the language of the Non-Paper was such that it a priori excluded the 
Belarusian authorities from a ‘constructive dialogue’ by ‘naming and shaming’ them for 
the stalling of such a dialogue and shifting the emphasis on the opposition, thus making 
the latter the main EU interlocutor. 
 
The subsequent failure of the Belarusian opposition to seize the day during the 2006 
Presidential election led the neighbouring countries, particularly Lithuania and Poland, to 
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foster closer contacts with the leadership of the country1, even though the conditionality 
principle had still been on the EU agenda in its dealings with Belarus.  For example, 
despite the principled, non-compromising approach to conditionality of the Novermber 
2006 Non-Paper, nearly a month later former Polish President Kwasniewski proposed 
“giving Belarus a chance to leave behind its isolation and open itself to possibilities for 
cooperation.”2. At the same time, Lithuania increased its high-level contacts with the 
Belarusian authorities, based on the logic that “if we don’t talk to them, Moscow will.”3 
Latvia, Poland, and Lithuania also opposed the removal of Belarus from the Generalised 
System of Preferences in 2006 for fears that this would hurt their respective economies 
(a consensus was found only six months later, in June 2007). The energy rows both 
between Belarus and Russia and Russia and Ukraine, which largely affected the EU, 
became another stimulus for the Union to put aside its strict conditionality and base 
dialogue with Belarus on a more pragmatic rationale.  
 
Finally, in August 2008, the changed geopolitical situation in the region after the Russia-
Georgia conflict spurred the EU to re-think its approach towards Belarus by shifting the 
negative conditionality to the background, and to embark on a pro-active engagement 
with the Belarusian leadership. Even after the ‘embarrassment’ for the EU following the 
results of the Parliamentary elections in September 2008, when the Belarusian 
authorities openly disregarded the EU’s call for a free and fair process, the EU moved to 
suspend visa sanctions against the Belarusian officials. Remarkably, to achieve it, 
Brussels officials engaged in the verbal equilibristic, emphasising ‘progress’ in the 
election process in spite of the many shortcomings noted by international observers. To 
its credit, the Belarusian government had released all political prisoners at the time, 
thereby meeting only one of the 12 EU demands, and removing the most publicised 
obstacle to the consequential engagement with the Belarusian leadership.  
 
The Belarusian authorities, on their part, tried to encourage the realpolitik approach in 
the beginning of 2008 by using small concessions to break down the EU unity and 
solidarity. Such was the release of several political prisoners in the beginning of 2008 
after the meeting between President Lukashenka and the German ambassador had taken 
place. That effectively was a measure to drive a wedge between the EU states on the 
issue on which the united front in pressuring the Belarusian authorities was most likely to 
be achieved – that is, the release of all the political prisoners, including Alyaksandr 
Kazulin. Indeed, the EU moved to open an EC delegation in Minsk even with Kazulin 
behind bars, and the issue remained on the radar largely due to the abrupt sharpening of 
the US economic sanctions against the Belneftekhim company. 
 
But the reasons for the lack of consensus on the issue of conditionality were not limited 
to the Belarusian government’s divide and rule games, or pragmatism of some EU 
member states. Some EU countries, for example Britain, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic 
states, while genuinely concerned with human rights in Belarus, believe that the Russian 
factor means the stakes are high enough for the EU to justify a continued partial 
suspension of its conditionality in a bid to engage the Belarusian leadership further. 
Others believe in the ‘small cracks’ approach, hoping that a limited engagement, 
primarily in the economic and humanitarian spheres, would help to open Belarusian 
society and promote a positive change in the country by default. For small cracks to 
appear, the logic says, no conditionality should exist at all as the government should not 
fear a European cultural expansion. In fact, the experience shows that the Belarusian 
government understood well the logic of the ‘small cracks’ approach and tried to 
eradicate the Western cultural influence as well as information by cracking down on 
international NGOs, restricting educational contacts, introducing tighter rules for 
travelling abroad, restricting international media, and others. In fact, the ‘small cracks’ 
                                               
1 Paradoxically, these were also the countries which supported Belarusian civil society and free media most.  
2 Balasz Jarabik, Vitali Silitski, ‘Belarus’ in (ed.) Young, Richard Is the European Union Supporting Democracy 
in its Neighbourhood?, p. 113 (http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/ECFR-FRIDE-Democracy-Promotion-Book.pdf) 
3 Ibid.  
MO  #04/2009EN      
 
www.belinstitute.eu 
 
4 
approach failed even more comprehensively than any conditionality that the West tried to 
impose on Belarus.  
 
After all, it was only the Netherlands which firmly abided by the rule that conditionality is 
essential for further demonstration of EU goodwill towards Belarus and declared that so 
far Belarus had not met the EU demands. But this approach may not be value-based 
altogether either: the Netherlands is well-known for its opposition to the enlargement of 
the EU further eastwards, and the human rights issue seems to be a convenient measure 
to resort to in order to ensure that the Union’s engagement with the countries between 
Bug river and the Russian border would not go too far. 
 
Although the five demands formulated by the EU in October 2008 represented a 
potentially more manageable, practical, and realistic conditionality, the EU once again 
failed to stick to its demands, and gave early signs, prompted by aptly managed 
liberalisation on the Belarusian side, that the Union would continue its engagement with 
the Belarusian leadership. The persistent lack of clarification and common understanding 
of how the progress on each of the five areas would be measured further discredited the 
proclaimed conditionality. The Belarusian government made it clear that its engagement 
with the EU meant a purely geopolitical exchange; that the West should not consider 
Minsk under obligation to ‘pay’ with reforms for the dialogue; and that, vice versa, it is 
Belarus’s willingness to reorient its geopolitical loyalty that had to be rewarded, including 
by dropping conditionality off the agenda. In particular, the Belarusian authorities 
welcomed the offer of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative exactly because they 
considered it a geopolitical project and a break from the conditionality-ridden ENP. While 
the language of shared values and conditionality was brought back to the EaP discourse, 
Belarusian officials declared that Belarus would pick and choose between those EaP 
programs that it finds most suitable. 
 
At the same time, it was the vagueness of the conditions that was advocated by some EU 
officials, who believed that concrete and benchmarked demands would prompt the 
Belarusian government to end dialogue, while minuscule concessions offered a win-win 
situation in which the EU would demonstrate a positive result of its ‘soft pressure’ 
approach towards Belarus while Minsk would appease the EU without making substantial 
changes. It has to be said, however, that small concessions made by the Belarusian 
authorities brought about some unexpected results: most importantly that the morale of 
civil society was boosted and a general sense that the worst of political repression was 
over helped to activate some of otherwise dormant parts of the civic sector. 
 
 
12 EU demands: what was achieved? 
 
The Belarusian authorities largely ignored the demands presented in the European 
Commission’s Non-Paper. Even in the condition relating to the abolition of the death 
penalty, which can be considered the area where most progress has been made4, the 
latter has still not de facto been abolished or placed under a moratorium as demanded.  
 
Against the background of a failure of significant advancement towards fulfilment of the 
demands, the two areas where effectively no progress has been made are the proper 
and independent investigation of cases of the people who have disappeared; 
and respect for the rights and freedoms of Belarusian citizens who belong to 
national minorities. In the case of the former, despite the assurances voiced by top 
Belarusian officials5 and the new appointments to conduct controversial investigations6, 
in reality only lip service has been paid to this demand. Since it is likely that the outcome 
                                               
4 For example, only five executions and one death penalty were imposed in 2008.  
5 For example, the one by Ryhor Vasilevich, Prosecutor General of Belarus, see BISS’ paper EU and Belarus in 
the Second Quarter of 2008: Analysis and Monitoring (www.belinstitute.eu)  
6 For details, see BISS’ EU and Belarus in the Third Quarter of 2008: Analysis and Monitoring, p. 5. 
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of such investigations would result in criticism of the government, which is believed to 
have been responsible directly or indirectly for the disappearances, the outcome on the 
progress in this field is not so surprising.  
 
The latter case, in the interpretation of the EU, is closely linked with legitimisation of the 
Union of Poles headed by Anzelika Borys. As the Belarusian authorities have refused to 
recognise the issue as problematic, they have naturally taken no steps to improve the 
situation; yet some observers have noted that the harsh measures against the leadership 
of the Union had ceased7.  
 
In a similar vein, almost no progress has been made in the right to an independent 
and impartial judiciary linked with an end to arbitrary arrest, detention and ill 
treatment as a large number of cases demonstrates only too well8. The sometimes 
brutal actions by the security services on those arrested at demonstrations, for example, 
and the lack of any action taken against the officers involved shows no progress or 
attempt to reform the use of force and harassment to restrict individuals showing 
opposition. The courts have also shown little change in their treatment of citizens, and 
more fundamentally in their human rights, even when the evidence of police was scant 
and sometimes contradictory. 
 
In the remaining seven demands, there has been some progress but it falls short of what 
could be seen by an independent observer as significant. An exemplary case to 
demonstrate the trend is the situation with regard to the demand for the Belarusian 
people to elect their leaders democratically. Thus analysts noted blatant disregard for 
this right during the conduct of the January 2007 local elections: massive arbitrary 
arrests, registration denial to opposition candidates, confiscation of print runs of 
independent newspapers and election flyers were among a great deal of other violations 
reported9.  
 
Although the Parliamentary elections held in September, 2008 showed promise in the use 
of associate members on election commissions, a less repressive overall atmosphere, a 
somewhat better campaign environment as well as in some other areas, the 
OSCE/ODIHR international election observation mission concluded that the elections 
“ultimately fell short of OSCE commitments for democratic elections”10. The concessions 
of the Belarusian government therefore in reality amounted to very little, and the fact 
that of the 110 Deputies, none were elected from the opposition, seems to bear out the 
suggestion.  
 
To its credit, there has been more recognition of the role that the OSCE can play within 
Belarus11 and the decision to establish a full EU presence in Minsk should also be viewed 
as a positive step towards the rapprochement with the EU. This is reinforced by the 
growth in the number of NGOs, several of which have been allowed to register in recent 
years, and their elimination by the courts seems to have ceased.  
 
Any progress towards fulfilment of the demands of the EU is an advantage to Belarus, 
although the reluctance of the authorities to move quickly in some of the demands is 
regrettable.  
 
                                               
7 BISS blitz No 13/2007 A Year After the European Message: the Reaction Of the Official Miensk to the 12 
Demands of the European Union (www.belinstitute.eu)  
8 For facts please refer to BISS EU-Belarus Monitoring and Analysis reports (www.belinstitute.eu) and BIIM’s 
Monitoring Report on Developments in Belarus (available at www.democraticbelarus.eu)  
9 BISS Blitz No 13/2007 A Year After the European Message: the Reaction Of the Official Miensk to the 12 
Demands of the European Union, p. 2.  
10 The Statement of the Preliminary Conclusions of OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Belarus, 28 
September Parliamentary Elections, http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2008/09/33271_en.pdf 
11 The OSCE Office in Minsk’s website (www.osce.org/minsk) shows an apparent increase in the events that 
Office has organised over the last 12 months as compared to 2003 – 2007.  
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5 EU demands: moving forward? 
 
The positive steps taken by the Belarusian authorities in releasing all political prisoners, 
including Aliaksandr Kazulin, by the summer of 2008 demonstrated that there seemed to 
be a willingness to show that progress on this front could be made, albeit that cynics 
would point to this having been achieved immediately before the parliamentary elections 
in September when the eyes of the international community were focused on the 
behaviour of the Belarusian government.  
 
The demand for no back-tracking on political prisoners was made to ensure that 
there was no reversal after the elections when the international community had lowered 
its intense scrutiny. Despite the progress in the long-term detention of high profile 
political activists, the arrest and imprisonment in the short term of citizens on political 
grounds continues although the actual number arrested is lower than in comparable 
periods in previous years12.  
 
At the same time, as BIIM’s Monitoring Report on Developments in Belarus notes, “rather 
than creating more political prisoners, more subtle forms of repression, including forced 
military service and “restricted freedom” (“house arrest”) are increasingly being utilised 
to control civic and political activists.”13 It would therefore seem that for the foreseeable 
future, the progress made is being maintained but the elimination of political arrests and 
imprisonment has not been achieved.14 
 
On co-operation with the OSCE/ODIHR for the improvement of electoral legislation, 
there has been a clear demonstration of willingness to discuss the topic, taking the 
initiative even further. In February, expert talks between the OSCE/ODIHR and the 
National Centre for Legislative Initiatives and Legal Research took place as a follow-up to 
the recommendations of the ODIHR final report on the September 2008 parliamentary 
elections. As a result, the Belarusian side in close consultation with the ODIHR experts 
has proposed to draft certain amendments to the Belarusian electoral legislation with a 
view to improving it although the amendments have not been made public as of today. 
Therefore it remains to see how effective any proposed changes will be in holding true 
elections in Belarus that are free and fair. 
 
The demand to ensure independence of media should be scrutinised from at least two 
perspectives. In a move towards freedom of information, the recent months saw the 
return of two independent newspapers (Nasha Niva and Narodnaya Volya) to official 
circulation; a post-factum media law round table with the participation of both state 
officials and independent journalists; the establishment of a public Media Coordination 
Council and the nomination of non-state experts onto the body; and an exchange of 
views between the Presidential Administration and the non-state Belarusian Association 
of Journalists. Also in a positive vein, should be viewed the decrease in criminal charges 
brought against journalists15, albeit that “criminal libel” still remain on the books – one of 
the most pressing concerns voiced by independent journalists.  
 
The reality also remains a ban on journalists working for foreign media without 
accreditation; the passing of a regressive mass media bill in June 2008; ongoing court 
trials against journalists and private periodical distributors; and an estimated 13 officially 
                                               
12 For exact figures, please refer to BIIM’s Monitoring Report on Developments in Belarus, p. 10. 
13 P.1. For example, most of the accused individuals in the “Process of the Fourteen” are currently under the 
house arrest.  
14 Three Vaukavysk entrepreneurs, Mikalai Autuchovich, Yury Liavonau and Uladzimir Asipenka, have been in 
jail since 8 February, on widely believed politically motivated charges.  
15 BISS’ blitz No 13/2007 A Year After the European Message: the Reaction Of the Official Miensk to the 12 
Demands of the European Union. P. 2. 
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registered independent newspapers being unavailable at state kiosks16. Thus the 
developments demonstrate that although some initial dialogue between the authorities 
and the advocates of free press is taking shape, further progress to consolidate the 
process is needed, and the EU demand has to be further worked on by the Belarusian 
authorities.  
 
The demand for better working conditions for NGOs has seen a mixed picture, with 
rather negative overtones. Indeed, over the past two years the authorities have 
registered several NGOs and specifically, the Movement For Freedom, spearheaded by 
Aliaksandr Milinkevich, a former Presidential candidate. Nevertheless, many have failed 
to get registered, despite appeals, and can only operate in a covert way and risk legal 
penalties if caught. The most recent cases include the denial of registration to the Nasha 
Viasna human rights group, to the Belarusian Christian Democracy party and to the 
Assembly of Pro-Democratic NGOs. It is clear that the hand of the authorities still 
controls which NGOs can exist.  
 
The control over the registered NGOs in effectively being able to carry out the work for 
which they were established has been retained. The articles of the Belarus Criminal Code 
which severely curtail the working environment and hinder the functioning of 
independent civic initiatives have not been reconsidered17. Neither have conditions for 
office rent improved for NGOs. Thus the way in which NGOs can legitimately work still 
severely restricts their ability to operate in a free manner. 
 
The EU’s demand to see convincing steps to ensure freedom of assembly and 
association presents again a mixed picture whereby official gatherings and protests 
were not banned altogether but were generally heavily policed with “ringleaders” being 
removed for no legitimate reason. The government continues to dictate which meetings 
can be held, effectively cherry picking the meetings of which it tacitly approves18 to an 
almost total refusal to allow gatherings associated with human rights19. Any attempts to 
hold unauthorised protests are generally met with a fierce crackdown by the security 
services often involving beatings20.  
 
In essence, out of the five demands put forward by the EU in October 2008, only one 
demand, namely the cooperation with the OSCE/ODIHR on the improvement of the 
electoral legislation, can be judged as formally seeing some unequivocal progress. Yet, as 
stated above, the substance of the legislative initiative remains to be seen as to its 
capacity to provide free and fair elections.  
 
In the remaining four domains, the pendulum-like developments have taken place, with 
the achieved progress being overshadowed by negative actions on behalf of the 
authorities. Overall, this attests to only a minor improvement in the unimpeded 
functioning of civil society and media, failing to address the core problems. Even though 
the recent months have seen the establishment of three public advisory councils,21 which 
include representatives of true civil society, a genuine dialogue between the Belarusian 
authorities and civil society is yet to take place.   
                                               
16 BISS’ EU-Belarus Monitoring and Analysis reports and BIIM’s Monitoring Report on Developments in 
Belarus.  
17 For example, Art. 193-1: “acting on behalf of non-registered organisation” or Art. 369-1: “discrediting the 
Republic of Belarus.” 
18 For example, in November 2008, the BPF party was allowed to carry out the annual Dziady procession, and in 
March – April 2009, both the Belarus People’s Republic rally and the Charnobyl March were authorised and 
went in a peaceful manner.  
19 According to the BIIM’s Monitoring Report on Developments in Belarus, the authorities refused over a dozen 
requests to hold meetings devoted to the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (p. 13) 
20 For example, according to the BIIM’s Monitoring Report on Developments in Belarus, several demonstrators 
were hospitalised following the crack down on the Day of Love’s 14 February action. 
21 The Inter-agency Working Group on Development of the Country Marketing, Coordination Council 
on the Media, and Public Advisory Council on Human Rights at the Presidential Administration. 
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GSP sanction and IMF conditionality: do conditions work?  
 
In June 2007, the EU took a decision to suspend privileged tariff rates for Belarusian 
goods on the European market under the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in 
response to the Belarusian government’s failure to respect the rights of independent 
trade unions and carry out the recommendations of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO). 
 
Even though the EU itself did not view this decision as a sanction on Belarus, some 
analysts considered it as such, while the EU linked it to its demand to respect the rights 
of the people of Belarus as workers to freely join trade unions and for trade 
unions to work without harassment in defending the people’s rights. 
 
The withdrawal of GSP coincided with the energy conflict between Belarus and Russia, 
when the gas price for Belarus was expected to hike significantly. At the same time, 
Belarus’ financial losses following the withdrawal of GSP were initially largely 
overestimated.22 These two factors, on top of the negative political image which the 
cancellation of the trade benefits entailed for Belarus – the same measure, apart from 
Belarus, was applied only to Burma – put the Belarusian government in a state of limbo, 
anticipating substantial damage to the economic stability of the country and fearing 
uncertainty about the future inflow of Russian subsidies. 
 
This prompted the Belarusian leadership to look to other financial sources and turn to the 
West, resuming contacts, leading to a thaw in relations. Most of the political prisoners 
were then released, and analysts noted greater freedom of assembly.23 A number of 
primary trade union organisations became registered and independent trade unions got a 
seat in the government-run body overseeing the implementation of the ILO 
recommendations. The GSP conditionality therefore yielded some initial results. 
 
However, once the energy dispute with Russia was settled, and even further reinforced 
by the new loans, whilst the government calculated that the withdrawal from GSP would 
actually have little effect on the Belarusian economy24, the authorities, after the short 
period of thaw, backtracked on the progress achieved and began to crack down again. 
 
Yet recent economic developments have started to change the situation once more. With 
Russia not any longer willing to buy Belarusian goods en masse, Belarus had to turn 
further to the European market. Difficulties spurred by the global financial crisis and 
rising energy prices for Belarus make the economic situation inside the country 
particularly vulnerable, and what seemed to be a small loss in the past bears negative 
consequences nowadays, with a substantial decrease in profits and wages.  
 
The fact that Belarus does suffer significantly from the loss of the trade preferences has 
been recently made public by the Ministry of Economy, when a deputy minister charged 
the EU with “taking far-reaching conclusions (meaning the exclusion from GSP), affecting 
the economic interests of Belarus”25. Belarus is now taking steps in the direction of 
returning Belarus into GSP.  
 
                                               
22 Equalling Euro 400 – 500 mln.  
23 Jarabik, Silitski, p. 112.  
24 On average it was to amount to Euro 30 mln, according to the BISS expert assessment. For oil and oil 
products, which amount to the majority of Belarus exports to the EU, the GSP withdrawal would result in 0.34% 
tariff increase. See for example, Exclusion of Belarus from the Generalised System of Preferences: Potential 
Economic Consequences 
25 Andrey Evdochenko, 7 April 2009, www.government.by  
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Examples of the latter developments are the restoration of the reduction index for trade 
unions, in December 2008, which thereby gave a reduction of their rent ten-fold. In 
January 2009, Belarus’ government took part in the conference organised by the ILO in 
cooperation with the Congress of Democratic Trade Unions to discuss how to implement 
the ILO’s recommendations, which was followed by the National Council for Labour and 
Social Matters approving an Action Plan for implementing the ILO’s recommendations26 
According to the Action Plan, the Council will improve conditions for registration of trade 
unions as well as investigating delays or refusals of registration. The progress in this 
regard is yet to be monitored.  
 
By and large, the case of the GSP sanction is indicative of the overall ‘theme’ of the EU 
conditionality – it does work only as a combination of factors, or pressures, from different 
sides: the exclusion of Belarus from the Generalised System of Preferences could only 
become a significant signal first in the context of the pragmatisation of the Russia-
Belarus relations and the US sanctions targeting Belneftekhim, and then secondly within 
the context of the global economic decline.   
 
In January, 2009 Belarus had a loan agreed of up to $2.5 billion from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) by way of a 15-month standby credit agreement with funds being 
released in tranches during that period and subject to review by the IMF on a quarterly 
basis to ensure that Belarus met the conditions set by it as fundamental to the approval 
of the loan.  
 
These conditions included the implementation of a new exchange rate mechanism linked 
to devaluation to a new dollar parity and switching to a new currency basket in line with 
Belarusian trade and financial transactions. The IMF also imposed conditions on fiscal 
prudence which sought to slow investment and consumption through reductions in wage 
growth and public expenditure, particularly in the field of state subsidies. The conditions 
further looked to economic liberalisation through a review of taxes and regulations on 
private companies so that the latter could operate without bureaucratic intervention and 
leading to a programme of wider privatisation.  
 
The first $800 million was released in January to Belarus following acceptance by the 
Belarusian authorities of the conditions imposed and the subsequent 20% devaluation of 
the Belarusian currency in January. The Belarusian government then also pledged to 
privatise hundreds of companies and take steps to attract foreign investors. 
 
The conditions imposed by the IMF have thus been adopted by the Belarusian authorities 
but the first IMF review is just being undertaken. The government understands that 
further tranches will only be approved if it continues to abide by the conditions. To that 
extent, the conditions imposed have worked insofar as the government is behaving 
responsibly in its economic policy.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
The monitoring and analysis above confirms that the EU conditionality strategy vis-à-vis 
Belarus has largely been ineffective. The failure has been ‘recognised’ by the European 
Union as became evident in the recent change of its policy towards Belarus. 
Nevertheless, conditionality has  helped to ‘structure’ the dialogue with the Belarusian 
authorities and keep important political and human rights issues on the agenda. Even 
when more ‘pragmatic’ EU member states pursued engagement with the Belarusian 
authorities, the arguments of the human rights defenders, civil society, and more ‘value-
conscious’ EU states forced the Belarusian authorities to make certain concessions, 
however inconsistent and variable, in the areas on which most international attention 
                                               
26 BIIM, p. 2.  
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was focused. Inept conditionality thus might have been a better alternative than no 
conditionality at all.  
 
Overall, even though the European Union has been striving for a coherent policy towards 
Belarus, reality was often distorted by competing self-interests and differences in opinion 
among member states. Therefore, the European Union neither stuck to a coherent 
policy nor was credible and consistent in what it was demanding. An enduring 
coalition behind conditionality may only appear if the demands put forward represent a 
common denominator in the opinion of all players. Moreover, these demands have 
to be manageable and realistic. Conditionality policy therefore can only pursue limited 
and specific objectives rather than wholesale goals, and the response to steps 
taken in exchange has to be transparent and graduated – in other words, compliance 
has to be rewarded adequately and timely. By the same token, for conditionality to 
be taken seriously, it should include a realistic prospect of disengagement if 
demands are not honoured. Yet, sanctions can produce only a limited result, and they 
should have specific objectives and be presented together with a clear, transparent, 
and credible exit strategy (i.e., a roadmap out of sanctions). 
 
Positive incentives are needed for conditionality to work and the benefits gained by the 
Belarusian government from compliance must defeat the domestic political costs. 
The case of the IMF conditionality sets a good example, when conditionality is linked to 
the implementation of specific economic policies and the main benefit is finance. It is a 
means of ensuring the execution of a contract, “a promise by one party to do something 
now in exchange for a promise by the other party to do something else in the future.”27 
The conditions are thus clear and detailed and the reward for their fulfilment is 
substantial. By contrast, the EU demands on Belarus are not just a set of conditions to 
receive defined benefits, but an evolving process that is highly politicised. 
  
Finally, as the situation in Belarus has shown, whilst progress can happen in some areas, 
there at the same time can be reversal in other areas. Therefore, the European Union 
should decide how to reward compliance in certain areas, while there is simultaneous 
non-compliance in others. This requires the EU to rank the demands and values it is 
promoting: should the improvement of the legal framework for elections or a moratorium 
on the death penalty be considered more important than insurances of basic political 
freedoms, for example? This would bear particular significance in the context of the 
Eastern Partnership, as integration amounting to the degree to which values are shared 
overlooks the problem that the sharing of some values may increase simultaneously as 
the sharing of others may decrease. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
27 Quoted in Grabbe, Heather. A partnership for accession? The implication of EU conditionality for the Central 
and East European Applicants. Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper 12/1999, p.4. 
